abstract: This article tries to answer two questions. The first is whether capitalist class formation is now taking place at a transnational level; the second is what regime of corporate governance is becoming dominant in the last quarter of the 20th century. The answers given are based on a comparison of the networks of interlocking directorates among the 176 largest corporations in the world economy as of 1976 and 1996. The analysis suggests that from the 1970s to the 1990s an Atlantic business system developed. However, Japanese firms are not integrated in this network while the European Union is indeed creating a European business community. The research lends support to the hypothesis that the network has become less a device for domination and control and more a device for building hegemony. This also suggests that corporate governance is increasingly based on exit strategies rather than on voice as has been common in continental European contexts.
accompanied by increasing levels of international labor migration, (3) the global ecological effect of capitalist production, (4) new forms of international governance and (5) the decline and disintegration of the nationstate (Therborn, 2000) . Some scholars also proclaim the formation of a transnational capitalist class as a feature of globalization (Sklair, 2001) .
In this article we want to investigate a more modest theoretical claim. We look at whether a transnational business community has developed. We contribute to the analysis of international corporate governance by analyzing networks of interlocking directorates. There are, of course, other forms of transnational transactions among corporations, such as trade, portfolio investment, or direct foreign investment, which knit corporations into market-mediated circuits of accumulation (Palloix, 1975) . What makes interlocking directorates interesting from a theoretical point of view is that they seem to be halfway between market and hierarchy (Fennema, 1982) . They may be devices of power and influence of one company over another, but they also may be instrumental in forging some form of consensus among corporate directors, thus creating a veritable business community. There is no doubt that within each advanced capitalist country the directors of the largest corporations form such elite communities. A wealth of research on national networks of interlocking directorates makes this clear (Useem, 1984; Scott, 1997; Windolf, 2001) . Much less is known about the international network of interlocking directorates; hence assertions about the formation of a transnational business community have had a speculative character. A considerable literature has accumulated consisting of such speculations, sometimes backed up with anecdotal evidence (Kennedy, 1988; van der Pijl, 1998: 123ff.; Amin, 2000) There is clearly a need for careful empirical investigation in this area.
Beyond considering whether a transnational business community took shape in the closing decades of the 20th century, our article considers how the international corporate network has been reshaped by the changing strategies and structures of corporate governance, which have been associated with the rise of transnational capitalism (van Apeldoorn, 1999) .
Four bodies of literature, reviewed in the following, serve to situate our research. We first consider whether there is actually an economic base, in the patterns of international trade and investment, for the formation of a transnational business community. We then take up Sklair's (2001) recent analysis of the transnational capitalist class, whose ethnographic detail complements our network-analytic approach and inspires our first hypothesis, but whose lack of attention to specific institutional forms of corporate governance leads us into the comparative literature on corporate governance practices. In this literature we find more sensitivity to national and regional specificities that adds nuance to our analysis and enables us to venture four further hypotheses about the shape and form of the international corporate network, interpreted as a marker for voiceand exit-based systems of governance. Finally, we revisit the major research in this field to date, Fennema's (1982) study of international networks of banks and industry, which provides the empirical basis for our analysis of the network in 1976.
Internationalization of Ownership
As Hirst and Thompson (1996) have shown, 'globalization' has not been a smooth, continuous economic process. In the perspective of the 20th century as a whole we see after 1913 a decline of exports and of foreign direct investments (expressed as a proportion of GDP) that is not recovered until well after the Second World War. However, foreign investment within the western world has increased spectacularly in the last 20 years. By 1996 the inflow of foreign capital into the USA equaled the outflow of direct foreign investment (Burbach and Robinson, 1999: 17) . In Japan, on the other hand, there is still a relatively small amount of foreign investment: even in 1996 less than 1 percent of GDP (Bairoch, 2000: 209) . Japan remains predominantly an exporter of capital. As is well known, with the increased volume of foreign investment has come a change in the pattern of internationalization. In 1970, nearly three-quarters of all foreign investment went to developed countries. By 1996, 60 percent of the foreign investment flows was between developed countries (Burbach and Robinson, 1999: 18) . Although the post-1970 trend is indeed toward more 'globalized' foreign investment, the developed countries still form the principal site of the capitalist world economy.
In the 1960s and 1970s we witnessed yet another form of internationalization of property and control relations. Following the example of Royal Dutch/Shell and Unilever that had been established as bi-national firms at the beginning of the 20th century, several companies tried to form bi-national corporations in the 1960s and the 1970s. But none of these new bi-national firms survived the 1980s (Fennema and Schijf, 1985: 256) . Recent difficulties that have dogged the most illustrious bi-national merger of the 1990s -Daimler-Chrysler -make a similar point.
It seems therefore that the wave of international mergers did not lead to stable transnational business firms. Transnational ownership structures did not seem a viable option. This should warn us not to interpret transnational class formation as an irrepressible tendency. When it comes to day-to-day organizational cooperation, differences in national cultures and perceived national interests still carry a heavy weight. What we did see in the 1980s, however, was a massive wave of international takeovers that increased the number of foreign subsidiaries.
We may conclude that the developed economies have shown a sharp increase in exports after 1970 and in direct investment after 1985. The import and export flows have become more balanced in the last 30 years and so have the flows of direct foreign investments among the core countries. This warrants the term globalization to a certain extent, even though this can also be interpreted as a recovery from autarkic tendencies set in motion by two world wars and a Great Depression and reinforced by the Fordist-Keynesian pattern of accumulation and regulation prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s. But does the situation also warrant the term transnational capitalist class (Sklair, 2001) , Atlantic bourgeoisie (van der Pijl, 1984) or transnational capitalism (van Apeldoorn 1999)?
A Transnational Capitalist Class?
Scholars who speak of a transnational capitalist class or of transnational classes tend to focus on strategies and perspectives. Most pronounced in this sense is the work of van der Pijl (1984 ), van Apeldoorn (2000 , Gill (1990) and Sklair (2001) . Sklair ends his recent book, titled The Transnational Capitalist Class, with a long chapter on 'Global Vision and the Culture-Ideology of Consumerism'. In this he tries to demonstrate that corporate executives think globally and that the ideology of global capitalism is consumerism. He finds this aspect of globalization so important that he includes merchants and mass media in the transnational capitalist class, along with globalizing personnel, globalizing bureaucrats and politicians and TNC executives and their local affiliates (Slair, 2001: 17) . He makes the plausible claim that such groups operate from a global perspective, although it is not quite clear whether they all have disengaged from their national embeddedness. His book is a sophisticated elaboration of the theory of 'Global Reach' that was launched by Barnet and Muller as early as 1974 (Barnet and Muller, 1974) , echoing the self-image of the corporate leaders, who like to portray themselves as citizens of the world. What Sklair does not show, however, is that these corporate leaders really form a transnational community that operates in a way as to warrant the term 'transnational class' in the structural sense of the word. Sklair does not answer the illuminating question posed by Therborn in his introduction to the special issue of International Sociology on globalization: 'Is the world a system shaping the actors in it and directing their strivings, or is it an arena, where actors who were formed outside act and interact?' (Therborn, 2000: 155) Following Therborn, we should only speak of a transnational capitalist class if there are structural conditions that reproduce a transnational corporate elite, independent of its national 'home' base, to such an extent that their collective 'transnational' identity shapes their behavior more than the national identities they carry with them as national citizens. To Sociology Vol. 17 No. 3 prove that there exists a transnational capitalist class is a far from easy task and we do not pretend to have a full answer to the question posed by Therborn. We try, however, to provide some pieces of evidence from which the full answer can eventually be deduced. Through a longitudinal analysis of the transnational networks that have been formed through directorship interlocks, we can gain a clearer sense of whether the closing decades of the 20th century bore witness to the emergence of a transnational capitalist class in the sense not of strategic vision but of structural condition.
International
Interlocking directorates can contribute to the creation of trust between organizations and thus lower transaction costs (Tomasic and Bottomley, 1991; Nooteboom, 1999) . Networks of corporate interlocks can also create trust among the corporate elite and thus contribute to the formation of the business community (Useem, 1984) and to the social cohesion of the corporate elite (Mills, 1956) . Interlocking directorates come about as a result of corporate or personal strategies, but once established they do much more than serve the interests of the sending or receiving corporations. They may have been established to exercise control over or to monitor another business firm, to act in collusion, to create legitimacy or even for reasons of personal career advancement (Mizruchi, 1996) . But their structural effect goes far beyond that. The network of interlocking directors has a unifying or fragmenting impact of its own, a unity or fragmentation that is not intended by anybody in particular and cannot be disarticulated or ignored by any single player in the field. By mapping the international network of corporate interlocks we investigate whether or not these interlocks connect the world's largest firms in one connected component or whether the network falls apart in separate national components. In the latter case there is no transnational corporate community even if most corporate executives can be shown to have a global vision and even if they would like to create a transnational corporate community. This brings us to our first hypothesis: 
Corporate Governance in International Perspective
Three trends seem to characterize the development of the international business system during the 1970s. First, we saw a spectacular increase in the networks of interlocking directorates among firms from the North Atlantic world (to be discussed later). Second, there was the shift of laborintensive production to the third world (the new international division of labor), a tendency that could eventuate in a diffusion of the corporate network to 'newly industrializing' centers such as Seoul and Sao Paulo.
The third is the globalization of the commodity and financial markets (illustrated by trade and portfolio investment data) and the move of banks into international consortia. Fennema and van der Pijl (1987) have argued that there was a shift of economic policy and corporate strategy toward 'rentier' investment rather than productive investment. The logic of money capital seemed to replace the logic of productive capital. Such shifts can, however, also be interpreted as a move from what Nooteboom (1999) calls voice-based to exit-based strategies of corporate governance.
Corporate governance in a broad sense is commonly defined as 'the rules and norms that guide the internal relationships among various stakeholders in a business enterprise' (Doremus et al., 1998: 222) . The question is whether the international corporate network has been reshaped along the lines of a particular local form of corporate governance that is becoming 'universal'. Here the issue is not whether the international network provides a stronger basis over time for class hegemony in the sense of a cohesive transnational business community but whether a specific form of business organization is becoming hegemonic, i.e. normative, in the world economy. This issue directs our attention to the forms of corporate governance that have persisted at national or regional levels in the world economy, and to the compatibility of these forms with the patterns of internationalized accumulation and neoliberal state management that became predominant globally after the 1970s. Do we indeed find a diffusion of Anglo-American, exit-based corporate governance in the EU and Japan? Or rather do we find corporate governance in European countries continuing to take a European form, while corporate governance in Japan follows a Japanese road to globalization? In other words, is path dependency working in the field of corporate governance or is international competition leading to an Americanization of corporate governance? Note that this question cannot be reduced to the problematic of transnational class formation. Americanization of corporate governance does not necessarily lead to a transnational corporate community (although this is what Sklair and other theorists of globalization implicitly assume), while path dependency in itself does not exclude the formation of a transnational corporate community. These are two different questions and they deserve to be analyzed separately.
The comparative analysis of Doremus et al. (1998) clarifies how differences in institutional frameworks and business culture have produced an exit-based pattern of corporate governance in the USA, but a voice-based pattern in Germany and Japan. In the USA, banks are traditionally weak because of legal restrictions that go back to the Glass Steagall Act in 1933 and that made the American business system strongly stock market oriented. The monitoring of business is very strict and transparent so that the shareholders have an 'early warning system' that allows them to sell their shares in case of bad performance of the company. Shareholders' use of their exit option leads to a lower value of the company's shares on the stock market and an increasing risk of a (hostile) takeover of the company (Nooteboom, 1999) .
In Germany things work differently. There, non-financial corporations tend to have large blocks of shares while the relationship between banks and industry is traditionally very close. In this voice-based system, the banks monitor the industrial firms and tend to intervene directly and discreetly if things go wrong. But the banks' reaction is in general not as swift as that of the stock market and the restructuration of the firm in trouble is not as rigorously pursued, as is the case in the USA. German banks and financial institutions are more patient owners and they quite often collaborate with German government to solve industrial crises. Such an institutional framework may be slower in reacting to bad management and sectoral crisis, but it is clearly a system that is gentler and softer than the US system and can have a better view on long-term developments. Doremus et al. (1998) have shown that the German institutional system has hardly moved in the direction of the Anglo-American stock market system. On the contrary, the industrial problems due to economic recession and in particular the reunification of Germany were solved by falling back on the old system of finance capital rather than by Americanizing corporate governance. The same goes for Japan where the keiretsu system seems to have been strengthened in the economic crisis that hit Japanese business in the 1990s:
While there is no doubt that corporations from around the world are increasingly interested in tapping large pools of capital, no matter where they are located, core Japanese and German capital markets are not likely to be overwhelmed by American institutions. (Doremus et al., 1998: 55) In our present research we focus on the directors and top managers of large corporations and investigate only a small part of corporate governance. However, since we investigate interlocking directorships among corporate boards we also take the concept of corporate governance further than is conventionally done in the field of business administration. In a system of corporate governance that is stock market oriented and dominated by exit-based strategies there is no need for interlocking directorates to control or monitor corporations. Does this mean that interlocking directors become redundant? We argue that their function has shifted away from hierarchy and control but not in the direction of the market. In our view, interlocking directorates have become devices of consensus and class formation. In an exit-based system of corporate governance interlocking directorates serve to spread information that is relevant to the business community, they serve to hammer out notions of the general interest and they also serve to marginalize those firms that seem to 'free ride' on the business community. Interlocking directorates create trust within the international business system and are therefore crucial in the formation of a business community that lacks state institutions.
In considering how a shift to exit-based corporate governance might register in the international network, it is important to distinguish primary lines -interlocks created when an officer of one corporation sits on the board of another firm -from secondary lines -interlocks created when an outside director of one company serves as an outside director of a second company -and thin (single-director) lines from thick (multiple-director) lines (see Figure 1) .
In cases where a pair of corporations is linked by a primary or a thick tie there may well be a hierarchy of control in place, or at least a formalized coordination of business strategies. But in the case of single-director, non-officer interlocks, i.e. thin, secondary ties, no such interpretation can be reasonably drawn. Such ties are more vehicles for class formation and business community development. From an individual firm's perspective they can be considered 'weak ties', but such weak ties can be very efficient at receiving relevant information (Granovetter, 1973) . The move from voice-based to exit-based corporate governance, then, should be reflected in a shift away from primary and thick lines and toward secondary and thin lines. Yet the path dependencies of emergent practices upon established practices can also be expected to reproduce national and regional differences in these kinds of intercorporate lines. This discussion allows us to formulate a second and third hypothesis: From the theoretical framework that has been provided by Nooteboom and the authors who have written on capitalist class formation we can also try to formulate some thoughts on the persons that carry the network of corporate interlocks. In a voice-based system interlocking directors are more often than not representing specific owners or other stake-holding interests in the firm (such as the workers). In an exit-based system the interlocking directors will more likely not be associated with specific interests. To build consensus in a system of conflicting aims and interests, a non-aligned position will be more effective than a position that is taken to be directly related to the interests of a specific firm. A director that has only outside positions can more easily formulate policy goals that go beyond the goals of a specific corporation or group of corporations. His or her proposals will be more easily acceptable for other parties that may have to overcome certain parti pris and have to give up some of its specific company goals for the sake of a common class interest. 
Empirical Evidence from Former Studies
The focus of this investigation is on the 1976-96 period. However, to situate our empirical material we need to review the findings of the only other longitudinal study of this kind. Fennema (1982) studied the interlocking directorates in a panel of 176 large firms from 12 countries in 1970 and 1976, a watershed period in which many of the features ascribed to recent globalization took shape. Fennema included in his network analysis the advisory boards of several North American banks -which are not vehicles of corporate ownership and control but may facilitate business scan. He found one big component of North Atlantic firms and one small component of nearly all Japanese firms in the 1970 network. By 1976, the large component of western firms had increased in size and now included two Japanese firms, which were however cut off from the Japanese network that had disintegrated into four small components. In the North Atlantic the proportion of interlocks that cut across national borders -hereafter transnational interlocks -grew from one in four to one in three. Concomitantly, the total number of corporate lines increased by 16 percent, along with most of the national densities. Internationalization and nationalization of the network went hand in hand.
The structure of the international network also changed somewhat between 1970 and 1976. German firms nearly tripled their transnational lines (from 25 to 65) and Dutch, Swiss and French firms doubled their transnational lines. (Fennema 1982: 186, 187) . All this suggests that capitalist class formation was speeding up in Europe. This did not coincide, as Scott (1997) has suggested, with a disarticulation of the national networks. Indeed, the densities of the national networks of interlocking directorates increased substantially between 1970 and 1976, except for Japan, the Netherlands and the UK. The same institutional embeddedness of ownership and control relations, which made the life expectations for bi-national firms so grim, may also explain why processes of transnationalization tend to strengthen rather than weaken national corporate networks. This leads us to our fifth hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5. The transnationalization of the corporate network has not fragmented national corporate networks.
The Datasets of 1976 and 1996
Because of the large number of mergers and takeovers that occurred since 1976 a panel study was not feasible; thus we have opted for a study of two cross-sectional samples. Our 1976 data are taken from Fennema's (1982) study and include all the directors of a stratified sample of the 176 leading international corporations of 1976. We have collected data on corporate interlocks from 176 international corporations in 1996, selected so that the composition of the 1996 sample matches that of the 1976 sample. The 1976 dataset consisted of the largest 135 industrial corporations and the largest 41 banks domiciled in eight countries or regions of the world economy (see Appendix). Such a stratified sample was necessary, particularly in 1976, to avoid the sample being dominated by the US-based firms. So US firms were intentionally underrepresented, while the firms from other domiciles were intentionally overrepresented. Our sample excludes wholly owned foreign subsidiaries, which typically function more as operating divisions of TNCs than as corporations in their own right, and which rarely share directors with companies other than their own parents (Fennema and Schijf, 1985) . 1 We constructed the 1996 sample to exactly match the 1976 numbers of industrial and financial companies in each domicile, so that in those respects the samples are equivalent. But they differ substantially when we look at the size of the companies. In 1976, the smallest US non-financial company included in the sample had a sales figure (in constant 1996 US dollars 2 ) of $15 billion; in 1996, the smallest US company had a sales figure of $25 billion. The smallest Japanese firm had in 1976 a sales figure of $0.5 billion, while in 1996 the smallest Japanese firm had a revenue of $27 billion. The concentration of Japanese capital has been tremendous. And because of that the overrepresentation of Japanese firms that still existed in the 1976 sample has disappeared completely. So while the smallest US company in the 1976 sample was 30 times as big as the smallest Japanese company, by 1996 the smallest Japanese company in the sample was slightly bigger than its US counterpart. Similar trends in Europe meant that, in step with the decline in American economic hegemony after the 1970s, by 1996 our stratified sampling yields much more balanced representation of companies from the various domiciles.
Despite our exact matching of the sample in terms of domicile, among the industrial sectors the two samples differ greatly, reflecting sectoral differences in the concentration and centralization of capital as well as the shifting importance of specific industries in the world economy. In 1976, the 135 industrial companies in the sample included 31 which had their principal activities in oil, 19 electronic and electro-technical firms, 17 automobile firms, 17 chemical firms, 13 iron and steel producers, 10 heavy machinery producers, and another 10 producing food and tobacco.
In 1996, the picture had changed completely. Now the electronic industry included telecommunications and there were 27 of these firms in the sample. The oil industry was in 1996 represented by 16 firms, barely half the number of the 1976 sample. Another spectacular change in the sample is seen in the iron and steel producers (declining from 13 to three) and non-ferrous metals (from seven to one). But most intriguing is the appearance of 13 trading and 16 retail companies that were not represented at all in 1976. So we may say that the production of raw material for heavy industry has declined in importance, while trading, retailing and telecommunications has grown. With the shift from 'old economy' to 'new economy', logistics and telecommunications have become more important in world economy and commercial capital more concentrated, while the traditional industrial products have become far less important.
Changes in the International Network of Corporate Interlocks
In this study a key distinction must be drawn between national and transnational interlocks. We can think of the international network as the combination of both sets of lines as they link together the largest corporations worldwide. In presenting our empirical material we move from (1) the most abstract and general characterization of the international network in terms of its integration and efficiency, through (2) a more concrete analysis in which we distinguish between the national and transnational intercorporate lines, to (3) a concrete analysis of the transnational interlocks and corporations that constitute the center of the network and of the individual directors who carry the transnational interlocks.
Our first results consider the extent to which the network has become more or less integrated over the two decades, irrespective of whether the change has its source in national or transnational developments. We may measure network integration by looking at two different indicators. The first, and most primitive is degree: the number of lines connecting a firm to other firms in the network. We can see in the first row of Table 1 that, among the entire sample of 176 firms, the mean degree falls slightly. According to this very crude measure, network integration slightly drops.
However, we see in the second and third panel of Table 1 that the slight decline in network integration is entirely due to the decline in primary and thick lines. 3 This means that the network has become less purposive. The mean degree of thin secondary lines has increased substantially while the mean degree of primary lines and of thick secondary lines has fallen. The network has become less integrated by primary and thick lines, but more integrated by thin, secondary lines.
Another aspect of network integration consists of its connectivity, i.e. the chance that two randomly selected firms are connected by a path. We call this connectivity overall network integration. The connectivity of the network in 1976 was 42 percent, while in 1996 it was 47 percent (Table 2, row 3). But as we can also see in Table 2 , the increase in overall network integration is entirely due to the secondary lines in the network. When breaking down the connectivity of the network at different distances the picture becomes clearer and can be interpreted within our theoretical framework.
We can calculate the number of firms that are directly linked by an interlock (i.e. adjacent, or related at distance 1) and by interlocks to a common third firm (i.e, linked at distance 2). The communication between firms at distance 1 or 2 is easy: at distance 2 the directors of the companies meet each other on the board of a third firm. Direct communication between firms at distance 3, however, seems implausible. This means that from the perspective of exercising influence the connections at distance three or more have little or no meaning. But this is not the case from a perspective of the business community as a whole. From a community perspective interlocks carry information and the better the information can circulate, the higher the potential for community building. A cohesive network is a resource to its members in the sense that it promotes trust among its member and thus the willingness to collaborate. Information spreads quite rapidly through cohesive networks even if via persons connected by long distance paths. Even network connections with distance 3 or 4 seem quite effective in passing on gossip that will allow the community to sanction members that fall out of line (Wittek and Wielers, 1998) . Such sanction is not the result of hierarchical relationships but of the disapproval of the other members of the business community. Another measure of the communication efficiency in the network is the diameter of the network of connected firms, that is the length of the shortest path that connects the two firms most distant from each other. This measure of efficiency of the network can be calculated, for obvious reasons, only for the non-isolated firms. In a connected component the diameter is the maximum shortest distance between two firms in the component. The bottom two panels of Table 2 summarize an analysis of distances in the network, taking account of the distinction between primary and secondary lines. Despite the slight decrease in the number of pairs that are adjacent (distance 1), the top panel shows that by 1996 a greater proportion of pairs of firms was linked at one remove (at distance 2), while the diameter of the largest component has become much smaller (8 instead of 11), along with an increase in connectivity. The network has become more efficient in connecting corporations. The potential for community building has increased substantially. The second panel shows that it is precisely the secondary lines (which increase in number) that have produced the increase in network efficiency. In contrast, the decrease in primary interlocks makes for a far less integrated network of primary lines. By 1996 the international network is predominantly a network of secondary lines. While the number of firms that can contact each other directly through primary lines at distance 1 and 2 has decreased, the communication efficiency of the network as a whole has increased. These results lend support to Hypothesis 2, which predicts that the network of corporate interlocks will in 1996 contain fewer primary and thick lines and more thin and secondary lines as compared to 1976. The network has become less a system of power and influence and more a communication system. Further support for Hypothesis 2 comes from an analysis of the connected components in the network, at increasing levels of line multiplicity. Considering all interlocks, the 1976 network contained a dominant component of 114 firms, each reachable by the others; by 1996 the dominant component numbered 119, and there were two minor components, one made up of 23 Japanese firms and one made up of three Italian firms. In both years, when we consider all interlocks we find a dominant component that takes in most of the companies based in Europe and North America.
However, at increasing multiplicity, the picture changes dramatically. In 1976, considering only multiple-director (thick) lines, the dominant component contained only 25 companies -24 of them European. By 1996, there was even less of a clustering of firms into components formed by thick lines, and no sign of a transnationalization of such clusters. The dominant component contained only 20 firms, 18 of them German and two Dutch. Considering only very thick lines (three or more shared directors), in 1976 the largest component numbered 15 (14 of them European); by 1996 the largest grouping was a predominantly French component of seven firms, which included Belgian-based Fina. At each level of multiplicity, the network also contained smaller components, each characteristically composed of companies from a single country. For instance, in 1996 the analysis of very thick lines evidenced eight small components, each purely national, and ranging in size from four to two. Consistent with our hypotheses, when we include thin lines in the analysis we find that a large North Atlantic component persisted across the decades and even expanded slightly; when we restrict the analysis to thick lines the components are smaller and more exclusively national, they involve predominantly European corporations, and they tend over time to become smaller.
Moving now to a somewhat more concrete level of analysis, Table 3 reports, for each of four regions, the mean degree of the four distinct kinds of lines that make up the entire international network (see Figure 1) . This analysis tests Hypothesis 3: when we distinguish between primary and secondary, thick and thin lines, how different are continental Europe and Japan compared with North America and the UK? As we predicted, primary and thick lines predominate more in continental Europe while thin secondary lines predominate in North America and the UK. The trend, consistent with Hypothesis 2, is toward more thin, secondary lines in 1996, even on the European continent, while the degree of thick secondary lines and thin primary lines drops somewhat. The fall of thick primary lines -those most indicative of traditional organized capitalism -is most spectacular in North America and in continental Europe. In Japan and the UK the trend is reversed: here we find more primary interlocks in 1996 than in 1976. This latter trend leads us to believe that the national systems of corporate governance have converged to some extent, even if they have not fully integrated into a transnational system of corporate governance. Contrary to what we expected, interlocking directorates involving Japanese firms are sparse and they do not live up to the expectation of a structure of finance capital that one would expect from the well-known pattern of intercorporate shareholding. Even though the Japanese banks and insurance companies own some 40 percent of corporate shares, they do not seem to monitor the corporations they partly own through a dense network of interlocking directorates. However, the lines that do involve Japanese corporations are largely primary interlocks. The loose nature of the Japanese directorate-interlock network should not, however, be mistaken for a lack of capital organization. As Gerlach (1992) has shown, Japanese corporate capital is primarily integrated through extensive crossshareholding within keiretsu. Also, personnel exchanges among members of a given keiretsu tend to occur not as simultaneous cross-appointments but often as flows from one company to another, with the director or executive maintaining contact after being delegated, to return to the sending firm some time later (Westney, 1996) .
National and Transnational Interlocking
As mentioned earlier, the entire international network consists in a combination of national lines (interlocks between companies headquartered in the same country) and transnational lines (interlocks between companies headquartered in different countries). Fennema (1982) found a substantial increase in transnational interlocking between 1970 and 1976, a period in which the network came into its own. How do the relative incidence and the patterning of national and transnational interlocks change over the 20 years under investigation?
The most basic longitudinal comparison involves a simple tabulation of the number of intercorporate lines -whether thick, thin, secondary or primary -across the main regions of the world economy. We find in Table  4 that the total number of lines decreases by 13, but that the number of transnational lines increases by four, so that by 1996 one-quarter of all the lines traversed national borders. The number of companies with one or more transnational interlock nudges from 68 to 71. These changes are clearly quite modest -not at all indicative of a qualitative change in the structure of interlocks. Nonetheless, they do support Hypotheses 1 and 5: there has been a (slight) increase in transnational interlocking, but even in 1996 three-quarters of all the lines link firms within national borders. 4 How are the transnational interlocks distributed among the major regions of the world? In rows d-h we find an increase in the number of transnational interlocks connecting firms based in Europe, a decrease in the number crossing the USA-Canada border, and otherwise little change. The major interregional axis is that between North America and Europe: in both years there is only one interlock venturing beyond the North Atlantic. Although in both years the sample includes the largest corporations domiciled on the semi-periphery, not a single interlock connects the boards of these companies with the corporate elites of Europe, North America or, for that matter, Japan. To the extent that interlocking directorates are an indication of transnational class formation, it is fair to say that van der Pijl's concept of an Atlantic ruling class remains apt well into the 1990s. The only notable development, not unexpected, is an increase in interlocking within Europe -the elaboration of a European business community at the level of corporate governance. This last observation, along with the lack of interlocks extending to Japan, refutes Amin's claim, stated without evidence, that 'capital interpenetration is no denser in inter-European relations than in the bilateral relations between each European nation and the United States or Japan' (Amin, 2000: 14-15 ).
The Network Core and the Transnational Linkers
Our analysis so far highlights overall trends in transnational and national interlocking that are relevant to our first four hypotheses, but it leaves unexamined the specific lines and firms that actually constitute the corporate network. Bearing in mind that the entire transnational network is constituted through the cross-border interlocks of approximately 70 firms, we now take a closer look at the specific firms and interlocks that are central to the transnational network.
When we consider only the companies with transnational interlocks to three or more top 176 firms, we find 24 such corporations in 1976 and 22 in 1996. That is, about 13 percent of the entire sample participated extensively in transnational interlocks, forming a potential center for the transnational network. Considering the set of transnational interlocks in which they participated, the core companies accounted for 62 percent of all the transnational lines in the network in both years; i.e. most of the entire transnational network was indeed centered around these corporations.
It is striking how in both years, banks have not been particularly central in the transnational network: the most transnationally interlocked boards have been those of industrial corporations. In both years, all of the firms with transnational ties to five or more firms (numbering four in 1976 and eight in 1996) were industrials. And, although financial institutions comprise 23 percent of our sample, only 18 percent of the 24 central corporations of 1976 were financials while the proportion in 1996 was 23 percent. Whereas the pattern in national corporate networks has traditionally been one of bank centrality (Fennema and Schijf, 1978) , the transnational network seems organized along different lines. This may be explained by the fact that the transnational network is one of consensus and community building rather than of monitoring and control, as seems to be the case in the national networks -at least in continental Europe (Stokman and Wasseur, 1985) .
Figures 2 and 3 map the interlocking among corporations most central in the transnational network. The actual density of interlocking at the center of the transnational network remains essentially constant (.28 in 1976 and .27 in 1996) . Yet only in 1996 do the 22 companies form a single component. In 1976 the 24 most central firms comprised a dominant component of 19, a tree of three Swiss and Italian companies, and two isolates, none of whose transnational interlocks involved other central firms. Although the center was no denser in 1996, it was more connected at the same level of density. The dominant component of 1976 included three (Anglo-American) companies with only one interlock each: the largest block within this component was made up of 16 firms containing no cutpoints. In contrast, the 1996 component not only included all of the central firms, but was itself a block, containing no cutpoints, as each company was interlocked with two or more other firms. Indeed, with the exception of Hong Kong Savings Bank, each company was tied to at least three other members of the core network. By 1996, firms with high degrees of transnational interlocks were tied to each other, comprising a wellconnected core to which other firms were tied.
In the dominant component of 1976, the key firms were Dutch (Shell and AKZO) and German (Deutsche Bank, Mannesmann, Volkswagen, Bayer, BASF), with Shell (and to a lesser extent AMRO) bridging between continental and Anglo-North American firms. The German-Dutch grouping was clearly at the center of the network, with extremely dense interlocking among the German corporations that extended to the three Dutch firms, to French-based Saint-Gobain, and to US-based Texaco.
The 1996 network shows less of a concentration of interlocking among a few firms, and more inclusion of French, Swiss, British and North American companies. However, one can still discern national clustering. The five German firms are still interlocked with each other, but at a lower mean degree (2.4 compared to 4.0 among the six German firms in the 1976 core network). Shell continues to serve as an articulation point, connecting firms from Germany, Switzerland and the USA, but the same can be said of IBM, which is linked not only to Shell but also to Swiss, German, British and American firms. Another noteworthy change, already signaled, is the decline in thick lines. By 1996, the core network contained fewer such lines, and the number of shared directors comprising thick lines had fallen. This again suggests a transition in the role of interlocks from control to information exchange and community development.
What of our fourth hypothesis, that due to the declining importance of voice-based corporate governance and the increasing importance of exitbased strategies transnational linkers in 1996 will tend to be more often Figure 2 The Core of the Transnational Network, 1976 Line thickness indicates the number of shared directors outside directors compared to 1976? This hypothesis directs our attention toward the individuals who actually carry the national and transnational interlocks -the corporate directors who serve on two or more boards.
In 1976, there were 317 such people, 50 of whom held directorships across national borders thus generating transnational interlocks. That is, 16 percent of all interlocking directors were transnational linkers. By 1996, the total number of interlocking directors had fallen to 270, with the thinning of interlocks, but the number of transnational linkers had increased slightly to 53, comprising 20 percent of all interlocking directors. If transnational linkers had gained a bit more profile in the international network, the key question is how national and transnational Figure 3 The Core of the Transnational Network, 1996 Line thickness indicates the number of shared directors linkers compare at the two times in terms of their status within firms in the sample. Table 5 categorizes the interlocking directors in terms of the higheststatus position they held in a sample company, using the categories employed in Fennema's (1982) study. In this categorization, occupancy of the top executive position is the highest status, occupancy of some other executive (insider) position is secondhighest, chairing the board of directors is third highest, and serving as only an outside director is lowest. The first two categories are indicative of an insider status with a top 176 firm.
Overall, there is a tendency for the entire international network to be carried more by outside directors in 1996 compared with 1976. In the more recent year, half of all the interlocking directors held only outside directorships in the sample firms. (Some of these, of course, may well have been executives in companies beyond our sample.) What is striking, however, is the trend away from insider status, or even the chairing of major corporate boards, within the category of transnational linkers. In 1976, only about a quarter of transnational linkers were outside directors; most were engaged in some capacity of executive or board leadership in one of the top 176 global companies, and nearly a third were top executives. Yet by 1996 well over half the transnational linkers were outside directors. This shift is evidence of a tendency for the transnational network to become a site of class formation more than a structure of intercorporate domination and control. 
Conclusions
In keeping with the primarily empirical character of this analysis, let us revisit our five hypotheses in order to sketch the lines of development in the international network and in the transnational business community. Across the two decades we have examined, ties among the world's largest corporations continued for the most part to respect national borders; that is, the process of transnational class formation did not fragment national corporate networks but occurred in tandem with their reproduction (Hypothesis 5). There has been no massive shift in corporate interlocking, from a predominantly national to a predominantly transnational pattern. By 1996, three-quarters of all the lines linked companies domiciled in the same country, down only slightly from 1976. Even when we examine the 20-odd companies that have the most extensive transnational tiesforming the center of the transnational network -we find nationally based clusters. Moreover, while national networks (with the notable exception of the USA -see Davis and Mizruchi, 1999) continue to be organized around large financial institutions, industrial corporations predominate at the center of the transnational network. All this suggests that the transnational network is a kind of superstructure that rests upon rather resilient national bases. As against those who in the trail of Wallerstein (1974 Wallerstein ( , 1980 ) see capitalism as a world system all along, we find that corporate governance still takes place predominantly within a national framework. This also explains why it proved so difficult to create a European legal framework for corporate ownership and governance (Rhodes and van Apeldoorn, 1998) . However, and consistent with Hypothesis 2, there has indeed been a loosening of the international network, which we believe reflects the tendency toward exit-based rather than voice-based corporate governance. The network has come to include fewer primary and multipledirector interlocks, and more interlocks that are carried by single outside directors. By 1996, very few companies were ultimately linked by primary interlocks. Even so, the basic contrast between Anglo-American and European business systems remained evident in 1996. Our findings are in line with the common idea that continental European corporate governance is more voice-based, while the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance is more exit-based. Our findings about Japan are less conclusive and need further investigation into the working of the keiretsu. Our findings also indicate that continental European corporate governance has become more exit-based over the last 25 years. All in all, national systems of interlocking directorates tend to resemble each other more in 1996 than they did in 1976. And yet the differences are still substantial, as we suggested in Hypothesis 3, and business communities are still predominantly organized along national lines.
None of this is to deny the evidence we have found of a developing transnational business community. Although, as Fennema found in his earlier study, the early 1970s were a watershed in this regard, the decades that followed brought a consolidation of the transnational network, as large corporations were drawn into a structure that is knit together mainly by thin, secondary interlocks and outside corporate directors (Hypothesis 4). The network has become more efficient: despite a slight drop in the overall density of interlocking, the connectivity of the international network has increased. Moreover the center of the transnational network in 1996 was more integrated yet no denser than it had been in 1976. While the total number of lines in the network decreased slightly, the number of transnational lines increased somewhat. There is thus some support for the hypothesis that a transnational business community is in the making. While this support for Hypothesis 1 is very modest, the striking tendency by 1996 for transnational linkers to be uninvolved in managing specific corporations supports our thesis that transnational corporate interlocking is less about intercorporate control than it is about the construction of an international business community.
What is equally striking is the extent to which this community remained in 1996 centered around the North Atlantic area. The modest proliferation of ties within Europe accounts entirely for the slight increase in the total number of transnational interlocks we have observed, while Japan, Australia and newly industrialized countries such as South Korea and Brazil remained effectively isolated from the transnational network. This raises the question as to whether we are witnessing simply the consolidation of a European economic community and not a process of transnational class formation beyond that. However, the continuing pattern of transatlantic interlocking counters such an interpretation. This EuroNorth American centricity is not surprising in view of the economic, political, cultural and geographical forces that had by the 1970s produced an 'Atlantic ruling class ' (van der Pijl, 1984) under American hegemony. Still, it underlines a certain disjuncture between class formation as a sociocultural process and the economic process of capital accumulation. The vast reach of today's TNCs and the increasingly integrated financial markets may be global, but the governance of corporations and the life of the haute bourgeoisie remains in important ways embedded in national and regional (including transatlantic) structures and cultures.
In our future work we hope to address this issue in greater depth and to go beyond certain limitations of this study. Our objective here has been to draw a series of exact comparisons between 1976 and 1996 by replicating Fennema's earlier work. This meant respecting the limitations in the construction of the 1996 sample of corporations that were built into the 1976 sample -studying only 176 firms in total, and selecting only the largest five corporations from outside the center of the world capitalist system. Our next step will be to enlarge the sample so that we include a greater number of corporations from all major sites of accumulation and corporate governance, including newly industrialized countries.
A second limitation of this research has been its singular focus on interlocking corporate directorships as vehicles of class formation. In future work, we shall explore the network of transnational relations that is generated by the participation of the world's leading corporate directors in such global policy-formation groups as the Trilateral Commission, the International Chamber of Commerce, the World Economic Forum and the Bilderberg Conference. Such international fora and business organizations, which have proliferated since the 1970s, seem to have become particularly crucial -if contested -sites for constructing capitalist hegemony in a globalizing world.
Notes
This article was written while both authors were fellows of the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and the Social Sciences in Wassenaar. We are indebted to the NIAS staff and to our colleagues Malcolm Alexander and Rob Mokken for a stimulating environment and many valuable suggestions. The research reported herein was supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada 1. By restricting the sample to companies that are relatively autonomous units of capital, we do not consider the parent-subsidiary directorate ties that make up a further type of limited transnational class formation within the organizational structures of TNCs. In this sense, our analysis provides a conservative estimate of the transnational network. 2. Using the US Consumer Price Index to inflate 1976 dollars to 1996 dollars: $1(1976)/.363 = $1 (1996) . 3. As indicated earlier in Figure 1 , a line between two firms may be thin (carried by a single-director primary or secondary interlock), or thick (carried by multiple-director interlocks). We call a multiple line that contains at least one primary interlock a thick primary line and a multiple line that contains only secondary interlocks a thick secondary line. 4. A detailed analysis of six countries (each with more than 10 firms in the sample in both years) showed that in each country and in both years leading corporations interlocked much more with each other (i.e. nationally) than with firms sited beyond the national border (i.e. transnationally).
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